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Abstract
This paper develops an empirical and theoretical case for how ‘hype’ among retail investors can
drive large asset fluctuations. We use the dataset of discussions onWallStreetBets (WSB), an online
investor forum with over nine million followers as of April 2021, to show how excitement about
trading opportunities can ripple through an investor community with large market impacts. This
paper finds empirical evidence of psychological contagion among retail investors by exploiting
differences in stock price fluctuations and discussion intensity. We show that asset discussions on
WSB are self-perpetuating: an initial set of investors attracts a larger and larger group of excited
followers. Sentiments about future stock performance also spread from one individual to the next,
net of any fundamental price movements. Leveraging these findings, we develop a model for how
social contagion impacts prices. The proposed model and simulations show that social contagion
has a destabilizing effect on markets. Finally, we establish a causal relationship between WSB
activity and financial markets using an instrumental variable approach.
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1 Introduction
A trite yet fundamental question in economics is: What causes large asset price fluctuations? A ten-
fold rise in the price of GameStop equity, between the 22nd and 28th of January 2021, demonstrates
that herding behaviour among retail investors is an important contributing factor. On this occasion,
thousands of retail investors launched a speculative attack on the short positions held in GameStop
by hedge funds, using social media as their coordination platform.
As academics and regulators alike grapple with the implications, many wonder whether large-
scale coordination among retail investors is the new ‘modus operandi’, or a one-off fluke. We argue
that this is a new manifestation of a well-established global phenomenon. Social media has changed
the fabric of society. Polarization, the spread of fake news and other societal challenges are some of its
documented consequences (Tucker et al. 2018). 4.2 billion people, or 53.6% of the world population,
are active social media users, each just a few clicks away from the next popular phenomenon.1 Now,
a growing audience turns to social media for promising stock market gambles.
To the extent that humans are a social species, personal interactions are likely to play a role in
financial decision-making. Consider, for example, that many bank runs (such as the Japanese finan-
cial crisis in 1927 or the Swedish bank run of 2011) have been triggered by a simple rumour. Studies
of social dynamics in stock market activity date back to Shiller (1984), a seminal paper reminding
us that ‘investing in speculative assets is a social activity.’ Internet communities are simply conduits,
enabling retail investors to come together at an unprecedented scale.
Nevertheless, we lack a holistic theory, backed by empirical evidence, for how social interactions
drive investment decisions. Practical difficulties and lack of data have restricted many researchers
to controlled laboratory experiments, whose external validity remains unchecked. The new invest-
ing climate, enabled by communications technology, offers both an extraordinary opportunity and
urgent need to understand the role that social dynamics play.
This paper sets out to reconcile the extreme nature of the behaviours on social media with eco-
nomic theory. We use text data from the ‘WallStreetBets’ (WSB) Reddit forum to gain insight into
investor social dynamics. Reddit is a social news aggregation site, ranked 19th most visited website
in the world, as of April 2021.2 Reddit, and WSB more specifically, have several desirable features
for this line of research. The WSB forum is completely anonymous, with the quality of content alone
driving further discussion. Users try to garner a following by galvanising their peers with their bal-
looning balances and precipitous losses, which they avidly post online. Finally, WSB has gained a
colossal following: the forum currently has over nine million self-described ‘degenerates’.3 Putting
these numbers into perspective, The Times newspaper recently boasted 7.5 million subscriptions.4
We first document evidence of social contagion on the forum. The working hypothesis is that
users’ expressed interest in assets depends on the discussions they engage with. Demand, much
like an epidemic, ‘dies out’ if the asset is not discussed. Accurately evaluating contagion from one
interested user to another is not straightforward due to endogeneity (Aral et al. 2009). This issue
is addressed with a two-fold approach: i) a panel regression, controlling for outside factors, and ii)
an opinion dynamics model that matches users on observable characteristics. The results demon-
strate significant contagion in asset demand after accounting for endogeneity. Users who comment
on discussions about an asset are between four and nine times more likely to subsequently start a
new conversation about the asset themselves, compared to their matched counterparts in the control
group.
The next question is whether investment strategies also transmit between users: in other words,
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De−meaned Trading Volume Prediction from WSB Activity
Figure 1: Hype-Driven WSB Activity and Trading Volumes; the predicted number of new users
interested in a ticker, for a given week, correlates strongly with observed weekly trading volumes
for AMD (Advanced Micro Devices) and MU (Micron Technology). Both series are plotted as four week
rolling moving averages. See Section 4.4 for details.
whether we observe consensus. We measure ‘buy’ versus ‘sell’ strategies via the expressed sentiment
about future asset performance in WSB submissions. The spread of sentiments about an asset can
be measured by the associated spillover from the network of discussions. This network links sub-
missions by their authors’ comments to older submissions mentioning the same asset. The results
indicate that sentiments in submissions correlate strongly and significantly with the sentiments of
neighbours, especially for bearish posts; the submission from a user who commented on a bearish
post in the past is almost 50%more likely to be bearish than indifferent, net of market factors. Social
interactions thus play an important role in determining investor sentiment. The asymmetry of the
transmission mechanism of bullish versus bearish sentiment is of particular interest. Despite users
encouraging risk-taking, there is strong evidence for risk-aversion and panic selling.
After characterizing the nature of social dynamics, a crucial question remains: what are the im-
plications for financial market stability? Some may argue that the key dynamics, contagion and con-
sensus, could lead to the fast spread of news and quick price convergence to an asset’s ‘true’ market
value. Others may consider the potential for unchecked rumours to permeate the investor commu-
nity, driving the market to diverge from fundamentals and to exhibit greater volatility.
In order to tackle this question, we propose a simple model with two mechanisms through which
social dynamics impact asset prices: i) ‘contagion’, which generates the hump-shaped pattern in de-
mand for an asset over time, as new investors initially buy into the hype but eventually become unin-
terested in an asset, and ii) ‘consensus’, which captures the extent of coordination in buying/selling
amongst these investors. We borrow from Shiller (2017) to describe the rise and subsequent fall in
investor interest. A discrete time simulation of our model, based on parameters initiated from WSB
data, demonstrates that assets experience an initial, slow rise in value followed by a crash and period
of high volatility.
We validate the existence of a causal link between WSB activity and the stock market through a
Two-Stage-Least-Squares approach. We predict new users discussing an asset on WSB using histori-
cal WSB and market data: these new users are ‘hype’ investors, driven to join the trading activity by
the excitement of their peers rather than by news or fundamentals. The predicted number of new
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authors, plus the lag in average sentiment, are fitted to data on price returns, volatility, and trading
volumes, after removing temporal and cross-sectional means. Our key finding is that our instru-
mental variable performs particularly well in explaining asset trading volumes. Figure 1 displays
this result for two heavily discussed stocks, namely Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) and Micron
Technology (MU). Hype investors appear cyclical: interest, built up over several weeks, eventually
fades out. Their activity is correlated to negative asset returns and higher volatility. These findings
offer empirical evidence of the fact that the bull runs generated by WSB activity are destabilising.
The next section comprehensively describes the data source and relevant variables. Section 3
brings to light empirical evidence of investor social dynamics. Section 4 presents a behavioural
model for how asset interest and sentiments spread among investors, with implications for asset




































Figure 2: Daily Activity onWSBPlotted on a Logarithmic Scale; the daily submission and comment
counts, averaged over 30 days, demonstrate a persistent exponential increase from 2015 to 2020, with
a substantial jump in early 2020.
Reddit, launched in 2005, is a social news aggregation, web content rating, and discussion web-
site. It was ranked as the 19th most visited site globally in April 20215, with over 430 million anony-
mous users by the end of 20196. The website’s contents are self-organized by subject into smaller
sub-forums, ‘subreddits,’ to discuss a unique, central topic.
Within subreddits, users make titled posts (also called submissions), typically accompanied with
a body of text or a link to an external website. These submissions can be commented and upvoted or
downvoted by other users. A ranking algorithm raises the visibility of a submission with the amount
of upvotes it receives, but lowers it with age. Therefore, the first posts that visitors see are i) highly
upvoted, and ii) recent. Comments on a post are also visible, are subject to a similar scoring system,
and can, themselves, be commented on.
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(a) A Typical Discussion on WSB (b) A Sample Screenshot of User Profits
Figure 3: What Does WSB Look Like? These snapshots exemplify typical discussions on WSB. The
exact text, usernames, and conversation details have been modified to protect user identities.
The WSB subreddit was created on January 31, 2012, and reached one million followers in March
20207. As per a Google survey from 2016, the majority of WSB users are ‘young, male, students that
are inexperienced investors utilizing real money (not paper trading); most users have four figures
in their trading account’8. The conversation guidelines outlined by the moderators of WSB handily
demonstrate the financial focus and whimsical tone of discussions:9
• Discussion about day trading, stocks, options, futures, and anything market related,
• Charts and Technical Analysis,
• Shower before posting,
• Some irresponsible risk taking,
• People sharing trades, ideas, observations.
We gain insight into the content of WSB discussions through a biterm topic model (Yan et al.
2013). The model detects a mix of conversations, from those that follow specific real world trends,
such as the China trade war or the COVID-19 pandemic, to those that hype positions on a hand-
ful of stocks and indices, most famously the GameStop (GME) short squeeze. Some topics persist
across time: people consistently ask for advice about trading accounts and anonymously share de-
tails of how their trading is affecting their personal lives. On the other hand, topics concerned with
specific economic interests wax and wane. Two examples of this are the uptick in submissions dis-
cussing GME and Robinhood account trading limits, coinciding with the GME short squeeze, and
the COVID-19 topic, which is negligible until January 2020, but gains prominence in the subsequent
months. A full description of the topic model and the temporal trends of topics are presented in
Appendix A.8.
The subreddit’s size grew exponentially since 2015, plotted in Figure 2. Two jumps are notable:
a smaller, seemingly idiosyncratic rise in early 2018, and a sharp spike during the COVID-19 pan-
demic. Figure 3a displays a typical exchange on the WSB forum: individuals discuss stock-related
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news and their sentiments on whether this will affect stock prices in the future. In addition to market
discussions, there is ample evidence of users pursuing the investment strategies encouraged in WSB
conversations. Users post screenshots of their investment gains and losses, which moderators are
encouraged to verify, as illustrated in Figure 3b. These observations are reminiscent of Shiller (2005)
in his definition of an asset bubble as:
A situation in which news of price increases spurs investor enthusiasm which spreads
by psychological contagion from person to person, in the process amplifying stories that
might justify the price increases and bringing in a larger and larger class of investors,
who, despite doubts about the real value of an investment, are drawn to it partly through
envy of others’ successes and partly through a gambler’s excitement.
All posts made on Reddit, plus their metadata, can be queried via Reddit’s API, as well as other
sources. In what follows, we downloaded data on WSB using the PushShift API10. The only caveat of
PushShift is that all data are recorded at the time of posting.
The full dataset consists of two parts. The first is a total of 452,720 submissions, with their au-
thors, titles, text and timestamps. The second is comprised of 15.4 million comments, with their
authors, text, timestamp, and their linked comment or post. The following sections will predomi-
nantly rely on submissions for text data, since they are substantially richer. Comments are largely
used to trace user activity and, subsequently, the interaction between discussants. User submissions
data, external to WSB, is also downloaded from PushShift, but is only available through April, 2020.
The availability of external user data forces us to rely on data until April 30th, 2020 for our analysis,
unless otherwise specified.
2.1 Identifying Asset Discussions
In order to understand how users discuss specific assets, we extract mentions of ‘tickers’ from the
WSB submissions text data. A ticker is a short combination of capital letters, used to identify an
asset in the financial markets. For example, ‘AAPL’ refers to shares in Apple, Inc. Appendix A.1
documents how tickers are extracted from submissions. Table 7 in Appendix A.1 displays the twenty
tickers that feature most prominently inWSB conversations. These are typically shares in technology
firms, such as AMD or FB. A handful of indices are also present, notably the S&P 500 (SPY) and a
gold ETF (JNUG).
A small fraction of the 4,650 tickers we extract dominate the discourse on WSB. 90% of tickers
are mentioned fewer than 31 times, and more than 60% are mentioned fewer than five times. The
frequency distribution of tail of ticker mentions demonstrates this point, for which Figure 4 displays
a QQ-plot. We arbitrarily selected tickers with the number of mentions in the top 10th percentile.
Even though threshold of mentions for this top decile is 30 subsmissions, the most popular, SPY,
features in almost 8,000 submissions. The orange crosses in Figure 4 locate the empirical densities,
on a log scale, which are plotted against the theoretical quantiles of an exponential distribution
on the x-axis. Under the assumption that ticker mentions are heavy-tailed (similarly to vocabulary
distributions), the logarithm of the mentions follows an exponential distribution, with the intercept
at the threshold, and the slope equal to the inverse of the tail index. Indeed, the linear fit is close
to perfect, supporting the assumption that the popularity of assets in WSB is heavy-tailed, with an
estimated tail exponent of approximately 1.03. In what follows, we used submissions for which we
identified a single ticker, unless otherwise specified, forming a dataset of 103,205 submissions with
unique ticker mentions by our cutoff date.
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Figure 4: QQPlot of the Tail in TickerMentions onWSB; the number of submissions for each ticker
(on a log-scale) is plotted against the theoretical quantiles of an exponential distribution. Quantiles
are calculated as q(i) = − log(1 − i/(N + 1), where N is the number of observations, and i the order
of the statistic, from 1 to N . The linear fit suggests that the data follows a Pareto distribution, with
the tail index equal to the inverse of the slope. The threshold for a ticker to be part of the ‘tail’ is 31
mentions; note the intercept, at exp(3.43) ≈ 31.
2.2 Sentiments about Assets
In order to thoroughly understand the social dynamics of asset discussions, it is not sufficient to
simply identify what assets are being discussed, as in Section 2.1; it is important to understand
what is being said about them. Our goal, with regards to the text data in WSB, is to gauge whether
discussions on certain assets express an expectation for their future price to rise, the ‘bullish’ case, to
fall, the ‘bearish’ case, or to remain unpredictable, the ‘neutral’ case.
A series of studies link sentiment, measured through diverse approaches, to stock market per-
formance (Garcia 2013, Tetlock 2007, Bollen et al. 2011). Gentzkow et al. (2019) offer a thorough
review. Many of these works use lexicon approaches, whereby documents are scored based on the
prevalence of words associated with a certain sentiment. Recently, machine learning has offered al-
ternative, powerful tools, such as Google’s Bidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers
(BERT) algorithm (Devlin et al. 2018). The BERT algorithm trains a final layer of nodes in a neural
network from a pre-trained classifier on labelled data. The classifier itself is a neural net, pre-trained
by Google on a corpus of Wikipedia entries to i) predict the probability distribution of words ap-
pearing in a given sentence (Masked Language Modeling), and ii) predict the relationship between
sentences (Next Sentence Prediction).
Among other alternatives, we pursued a supervised-learning approach to identify the sentiment
expressed about an asset within a WSB submission. This required a training dataset, for which
we manually labelled 2,581 random submissions with unique ticker mentions as either ‘bullish,’
‘bearish’ or ‘neutral,’ with respect to the authors’ expressed expectations for the future price. We
used the BERT algorithm for labeling. Work not shown here implements an alternative regression-
based approach as a robustness check, but BERT performs better out-of-sample. We discuss BERT’s
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results and accuracy in Appendix A.2.
3 Social Dynamics among Retail Investors: Evidence of Contagion and
Consensus
Do investors express demand for an asset because of an independently perceived payoff, or because
of another investor’s stated interest? The endogenous dynamics in the WSB community can be esti-
mated as a spillover rippling through a network of people, linked by their interactions on WSB.
Section 3.1 quantifies the spread in asset interest through the WSB network. It pursues a two-
fold approach: i) a regression estimating the probability of current discussants of an asset to attract
a greater following, and ii) matching on observables, outlined in Leng et al. (2018), Lehmann &
Ahn (2018), in order to estimate a causal link between a user’s engagement with a stock and their
future posting activity on that ticker. Both approaches attempt to mitigate the problems arising from
homophily in endogenous link formation in networks, discussed in Aral et al. (2009).
Section 3.2 studies consensus among investors: if a user engages in a discussion about an asset
with an expressed sentiment, what is the probability they adopt the same sentiment? The evolu-
tion of collective dynamics on social networks are studied in many contexts, including healthcare
outcomes and product adoption, among others (Christakis & Fowler 2008, Lehmann & Ahn 2018).
Their methodology builds a logistic regression model for the dependent variable at time t + 1 as a
function of demographic attributes and the status of the dependent variable among contacts at time
t. This paper pursues a similar approach as it is a fruitful, simple way to gain an estimate of peer
influence The results demonstrate that the WSB network exhibits significant sentiment contagion, as
older submissions influence future sentiments, to the degree that users interact.
3.1 Contagion in Asset Demand





























































Figure 5: Ticker Activity versus Overall WSB Activity; the number of unique monthly active users
(users who comment or post) on the left y-axis plotted against the unique number of posters about a
specific ticker (on the right y-axis). Both are plotted as 3-month rolling means.
This section sets out to demonstrate empirically that asset interest, among investors on the WSB
forum, is subject to contagion. Figure 5 shows how stock discussions permeate the forum for a
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select subset of popular stocks: we plot the three-month rolling average of the number of unique
authors who post about a specific ticker. Visually, an initial group of users appears to attract a larger
following. Eventually, interest is a specific asset dissipates, as users turn to new opportunities. Such
behaviour is reminiscent of a Kermack-McKendrick Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) epidemic
model, proposed for the economic context in Shiller (2017).
First, we perform a least-squares regression analysis to isolate the impact that discussions on the
forum have on begetting further discussions. We find that conversations on WSB indeed have an
endogenous component, which lends credibility to the fact that social contagion plays a role in asset
interest. Second, we perform a matching on observables exercise both to validate our initial results,
and isolate a mechanism through which contagion occurs.




∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.40∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.38∗∗∗ (0.002)
∑3
j=1Ai,t−j −0.06







α 0.15∗∗∗ (0.01) −0.002 (0.01) −0.01 (0.01)
Model Pooled Within-week Within-week
N 118,024 118,024 116,326
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.48 0.51
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: This table presents coefficients for an OLS model estimating the number of new users, ∆Ai,t , discussing a ticker
on WSB from the set of independent variables in Eq. 1: Ai,t−1 is the number of unique authors who posted a submission
on ticker i in weeks t − 1 to t − 3, and
∑3
j=1Ai,t−j is the cumulative count of unique authors. Column (1) estimates the
OLS coefficients by pooling all the available data, and column (2) subtracts the cross-sectional mean in a given week from
each variable, to control for unobserved time heterogeneity. In particular, we may be concerned with WSB boasting a
larger following in recent years. In column (3), we include controls for the average price return, Rei,t , price return standard
deviation, σi,t , and average dollar trading volumes, Qi,t , for asset i in week t. Details on the construction of financial
variables are provided in Appendix A.3.
A Simple Estimate for Contagion Perhaps the simplest framework to test whether discussions
are self-perpetuating is to look at whether a current user discussing an asset attracts new users to
the conversation. The hypothesis is that the number of new users posting about a ticker at time t
increases with the number of users discussing the ticker at the previous time step, t −1. The number
of new users who join the discussion is expected to decline with the cumulative number of users
who discussed the asset in the past since, at a certain point, users may decide that the investment
opportunity expired, and seek fresh ideas.
The relationship between the current set of discussants of an asset and the entry of new users
into the conversation may be driven by unobserved confounding factors. To assess this possibility,
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we evaluate the effect using a panel framework, controlling for exogenous variables and temporal
shifts. Our model of choice is an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression:




′Xi,t + εi,t , (1)
where ∆Ai,t is a measure for the number of new users who post a submission on asset i within
calendar week t; Ai,t−1 is the stock of existing users;
∑T
j=1Ai,t−j is the cumulative stock of users; Xi,t
is a vector of controls; εi,t is an error term. We find the number of existing users, Ai,t−1, by counting
the number of unique authors who posted a submission on asset i between weeks t − 3 and t − 1. We
calculate the cumulative stock of users,
∑T
j=1Ai,t−j , by summing Ai,t−js, from an assumed starting
point j = 3 to j = 1. Our cumulative stock of users proxies the total amount of coverage the ticker
has received in the last three weeks; we expect the number of new users to decline as this cumulative
stock increases. We experiment with different time horizons and observe that our results remain
largely unchanged; we choose to use three weeks of data to predict activity in the following week
based on the observation that ticker discussions evolve over several months, as shown in Figure 5. In
order to get reasonable coverage, we restrict ourselves to tickers mentioned over 30 times, coinciding
with the tail tickers in Figure 4.
The key results are displayed in Table 1, estimating the coefficients from Eq. 1. We observe
that enthusiasm about a ticker spreads from one user to the next. This effect is reflected by the
estimate for coefficient c. The estimated coefficient r, on the other hand, proxies for the fact that,
eventually, the set of new users who could become interested in a given asset is depleted, while
current discussants move onto the next exciting stock. c and r can be likened to the ‘contagion
rate’ and ‘recovery rate’ within the epidemiological SIR model: as more people get infected, they
will infect others (captured by positive c), however, as individuals recover, the population becomes
immune (captured by a negative r). The coefficients are statistically significant across all variants
of our model. We also find an adjusted R2 value of approximately 0.5 for all constructions of our
model. Almost half of the variance in the number of new authors is explained by our two contagion
variables.
Let us consider the implications of the most basic construction of the model, presented in column
(1). If ten authors posted a submission on asset i in the preceding week (t − 1), the model estimates
that four new authors post their own submission on the same asset in the subsequent week (t). Now
consider a similar scenario, differing only in the fact that 50 different authors post about the asset
two weeks before (at t − 2). Our model would now estimate that 18 new authors emerge: calculated
as 0.40× 60− 0.06× 110 + 0.15. In the latter case, the model captures that, despite the high number
of authors currently involved in the ticker discussion, the conversation is potentially on a decline.
Column (2) addresses an important problem concerning the assumption of a fixed population of
users. Clearly, the number of users, seen in Figure 2, is anything but fixed. To account for this time
pattern, we calculate the within-week deviations of all variables, by subtracting their cross-sectional
averages in each week t. This procedure is identical to introducing week dummies, or time fixed
effects. Column (2) demonstrates that the coefficients are entirely robust, with the exception of the
constant, which turns insignificant.
In the column (3), we are interested in controlling for the stock market behaviour of asset i. It
is entirely plausible that users create new submissions to discuss i’s large returns, large volatility, or
large trading volume in week t. To control for these patterns, we introduce the average excess rate of
return in week t, Rei,t , the average standard deviation in the excess rate of return, σi,t , and the average
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dollar volume of shares traded in billions of USD, Qi,t , using data from The Center for Research on
Security Prices (CRSP). We detail the computation of each variable in Appendix A.3. Each of these
controls is again expressed in terms of deviations from weekly averages across assets. Indeed, all are
significant in explaining the number of new authors, but the improvement in R2 is marginal. The
surprising finding is that the relationship between new authors and average price returns appears
negative. Our parameters of interest, c and r, remain largely unchanged.
Identifying the Contagion Mechanism: Matching on Observables According to Table 1, asset
discussions indeed seem to have an endogenous component. However, canWSB lend us more insight
into the transmission mechanism from one passionate investor the next?
In order to validate our earlier result, we measured the propensity for a user to post a submission
about a ticker, conditional on them previously commenting on submissions discussing the same
ticker. The main challenge comes in addressing the network’s endogenous link formation, as hidden
characteristics will determine a user’s choice to comment. This problem, known as ‘homophily’ in
the broader network literature, leads to an overestimated spillover (Aral et al. 2009). We address this
issue by matching on observable user characteristics. We filter the sample of submissions to the top
one percent of tickers (top percentile tickers), by number of mentions, for this portion of our study.
Individuals who commented on a top percentile ticker submission form the treatment group, and are
matched to users who did not comment, the control group.
One important form of homophily to control for is individuals’ exposure to movements in the
asset price: one may take interest in a stock because it experiences outsized returns, rather than
hearing about it from someone else. To tackle this, we matched individuals who commented on a
submission with those who did not comment, but were active on the forum shortly after the submis-
sion was made. This effectively controls for exposure to the same market environment, as well as
associated news. In order to control for overall behavioural patterns, we matched individuals based
on similar posting and commenting patterns, and on similar activity times on WSB. Lastly, to en-
sure the most accurate match, we consider individual’s interests in other subreddits, and match with
those who share similar interests. Appendix A.4 offers further details on the distance measures used
to compare users.
Following complex contagion theory, the spread of interests and beliefs may require multiple
sources of activation, or social reinforcement (Lehmann & Ahn 2018). In order to quantify the level
of social reinforcement necessary to drive a transmission in interest, users were grouped for every
ticker by their commenting frequency on submissions related to that ticker. About 90% of users
commented on fewer than five different submissions about a specific ticker; we, therefore, grouped
together those who commented on five or more submissions. We matched each group separately to
different control groups. Regardless of the number of submissions they commented on, we do not
include commenters on the same ticker in any control groups for that ticker. Henceforth, we consider
the number of distinct submissions that an individual commented on, prior to their submission,
the amount of treatment this individual received. This effectively yields five treatment groups, for
people who commented on one, two, three, four, or over five different submissions. These categories
are plotted on the bottom of Figure 6.
The result of interest is the difference in the observed proportion of submissions in the treatment
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Figure 6: Estimated Effect of Commenting on Posting a New Submission; the distribution of the
estimated treatment effect (π̂Tj − π̂
C
j ) across the top one percent of tickers is graphed as a series of box
plots. The solid line connects the median estimate, and the protruding dashes represent the 5th and
95th percentiles. The histogram below shows the proportion of individuals who comment between
one and over five times on a submission for a given ticker before either creating a post themselves,
or losing interest.
πTj = E(πi,j,t+T = 1|li,j,t = 1),
πCj = E(πi,j,t+T = 1|li,j,t = 0),
and πi,j,t+T is one if user i posts a novel submission on asset j at some time t + T , and li,j,t is one
if user i previously commented on a submission about asset j at time t. li,j,t is only observed once
for each individual i. Therefore, we constructed the counterfactual, π̂Cj , from users matched to the
commenters based on observable characteristics. The difference π̂Tj − π̂
C
j thus measures the likeli-
hood a user will post a submission given they are exposed to the asset on WSB, and not because of
unobserved characteristics.
Figure 6 presents the observed differences in proportions as a function of the frequency with
which a user commented. The first important result is that all differences in proportion are positive,
implying that engaging in discussions on WSB about an asset strictly increases future interest in the
asset. This effect becomes more prominent the more a user comments on submissions related to
the same asset, suggesting some form of threshold contagion in asset demand. However, the small
samples for users who commented four or over five times introduce large confidence boundaries.
12
The effect in Figure 6 appears small in absolute terms, however, we must consider that there is an
order of magnitude more comments than submissions, as seen in Figure 2. On average, we observed
a fourfold increase in the probability of authoring a new submission on an asset when an individual
is exposed to a single submission on the same asset. The probability increases with the number of
comments on distinct submissions. Further details on baseline probabilities for people who post in
both the control and treatment groups are available in Appendix A.4.
3.2 Consensus Formation among Investors
Net of interest, the question still remains whether the WSB community actively forms a consensus
on the direction an asset will take in the future. This section studies the network of user interactions
on WSB in relation to the sentiments detected in user submissions. We find evidence that individual
opinion formation is based, in part, on the opinions of peers, net of any price trajectory. This is
indicative of consensus formation among investors.
User Interaction Network We formed user interaction networks in the following steps. First, we
extracted all submissions that contain a single mention of an asset; these count as nodes. We placed
a directed edge, from an earlier submission to a later one if the author of the later submission com-
mented on the earlier submission. Submissions with the same author are not linked - an author’s
own previous submissions about a ticker are considered as a separate, independent variable when
evaluating network effects. The resulting graph characterises the dynamic network through which
active buying, or selling, decisions spread. If one individual comments on a submission about a
ticker, prior to expressing their own view on this ticker, their revealed sentiment may be influenced
by the initial submission they commented on. This section uses this network to track the flow of
buying, or selling, preferences from one submission to the next.
Individual Opinion Formation The extent to which buying and selling decisions between linked
submissions correlate, net of their relationship to actual price movement in the underlying asset,
can be used to approximate a spillover from social interaction. We define φi as i’s opinion, or senti-
ment, which embodies their expectation of the future price trajectory of an asset, reminiscent of the
extrapolation exercise that ordinary investors perform in the model of Barberis et al. (2018).
The following multinomial logit problem isolates the spillover coefficients of interest using a
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︸                  ︷︷                  ︸
spatial lag
+εi,t , (2)
where the dependent variable is the log probability of recording sentiment s ∈ {+,−} at time t for
author i, over the neutral benchmark s = 0. Ret is the daily price return in excess of the market return
of the asset being discussed; R̃et is the weekly excess return; σt is the standard deviation in excess
returns; m is a constant term. We measure σt as the standard deviation in excess returns, R
e
t , in
the ten days preceding the timestamp of i’s submission (See Appendix A.3 for details). We drop a
subscript denoting that the submission and all related variables are calculated for a specific ticker
since each network refers to a specific asset; this is also done for Eq. 3 later in this section.
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The persistence of i’s sentiment is separated in the form of a lag term αφi,−1, where the subscript
−1 indicates a previous time period. φi,−1 is a set of dummies: φ
NA
i,−1 = 1 if the author has not posted
before, φsi,−1 = 1 if sentiment s is expressed in an author’s previous submission about the asset. These
covariates, in isolation, form the baseline model for user sentiment, as indicated in Eq. 2. Further
details on the timing of t, are covered in Appendix A.3.
The spatial lag model augments this baseline model by introducingW , the normalised adjacency
matrix for the network, described at the start of this section. Elements in W , wi,j , equal the number
of comments made by author i on an older submission by a different author j with the same extracted
ticker, divided by the total number of comments made by i’s author on all older submissions with
the same extracted ticker. With neutral sentiments as the benchmark case, scalar βs is the log-odds
of a submission expressing sentiment φi = s, given that fraction wi,j ≤ 1 neighbours also express
sentiment s. For presentation, we use matrix notation Wφs instead of the summation term in Eq.
2. Finally, persistent average sentiments are further captured by the constant m, and εi,t denotes the
error term.
Table 2: WSB Sentiment Spillovers
Dependent variable:
φi = −1 φi = +1 φi = −1 φi = +1 φi = −1 φi = +1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Re −.46∗∗∗ (.07) .03 (.03) −.46∗∗∗ (.07) .02 (.03) −.47∗∗∗ (.07) .02 (.03)
R̃e −.21∗∗∗ (.04) .04∗∗∗ (.02) −.20∗∗∗ (.04) .04∗∗∗ (.02) −.19∗∗∗ (.04) .03∗∗ (.02)
σ −.84∗∗∗ (.16) −.95∗∗∗ (.10) −.86∗∗∗ (.16) −.97∗∗∗ (.10) −.96∗∗∗ (.16) −1.00∗∗∗ (.11)
φ+−1 −.44
∗∗∗ (.03) .45∗∗∗ (.02) −.42∗∗∗ (.03) .46∗∗∗ (.02) −.43∗∗∗ (.04) .48∗∗∗ (.02)
φ0−1 −.80
∗∗∗ (.03) −.38∗∗∗ (.02) −.78∗∗∗ (.03) −.37∗∗∗ (.02) −.81∗∗∗ (.03) −.39∗∗∗ (.02)
φ−−1 .72
∗∗∗ (.04) −.17∗∗∗ (.04) .72∗∗∗ (.04) −.16∗∗∗ (.04) .76∗∗∗ (.04) −.16∗∗∗ (.04)
φNA−1 −.22
∗∗∗ (.02) .04∗∗∗ (.01) −.23∗∗∗ (.02) .02 (.01) −.23∗∗∗ (.02) .03∗ (.01)
Wφ+ −.12∗∗∗ (.04) .09∗∗∗ (.03) −.16∗∗∗ (.04) .08∗∗∗ (.03)
Wφ0 −.21∗∗∗ (.04) −.19∗∗∗ (.03) −.25∗∗∗ (.04) −.19∗∗∗ (.03)
Wφ− .39∗∗∗ (.05) −.20∗∗∗ (.05) .35∗∗∗ (.06) −.19∗∗∗ (.05)
WRe −.16 (.20) .20∗∗ (.09)
W R̃e −.06 (.06) .02 (.03)
Wσ .93∗ (.48) .04 (.36)
m −.73∗∗∗ (.01) −.07∗∗∗ (.01) −.71∗∗∗ (.02) −.04∗∗∗ (.01) −.71∗∗∗ (.02) −.04∗∗∗ (.01)
Model Baseline Spatial Lag Spatial Durbin
AIC 193,749.7 193,573.9 188,355.5
McFadden’s R2 .01 .01 .01
N 95,981 95,981 93,412
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: This table presents estimated log-odds coefficients for three multinomial logit models on the expressed sentiment
in WSB submissions. Odd columns estimate the log-odds ratio of user i’s sentiment being bearish, φi = −1. Similarly, even
columns estimate the ratio of user i’s sentiment being bullish, φi = +1. Neutral submissions serve as the benchmark.
An alternative model of interest is the spatial Durbin model, which includes spatial lags of co-
variates in Eq. 2. As far as sentiment transmission goes, this model is useful because it considers the
price movements of the discussed asset when the current author commented on the linked submis-
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spatial Durbin
+εi,t . (3)
Table 2 presents the results of the multinomial models specified in Eqs. 2-3. For further details,
we outline the construction of each variable in Appendix A.3. The baseline model in columns (1)
and (2) suggests that submissions are more likely to be bearish versus neutral on days where the
excess return of the asset is low. The estimated coefficient of -0.46 translates to an increase in the
probability of the submission being bearish by almost 5% if the asset price drops by 10% in excess
of the market return on the day that the submission is made. The converse for bullish posts is
smaller and statistically insignificant. The return over a trading week is a significant variable; a -10%
accumulated return over the preceding five trading days increases the probability of a submission
being bearish by 2.1%, and reduces the probability of a submission being bullish by 0.4%. Moreover,
the standard deviation in daily returns observed in the previous five trading days strongly increases
the likelihood that a submission expresses neutral opinions. Overall, sentiments follow current and
recent changes in the asset prices, but high volatility increases users’ expressed uncertainty on the
future trajectory of the asset.
Beyond price performance, authors’ sentiments persist over time. Submissions are 56.8% more
likely to express bullishness if the same author previously made a bullish post about the ticker, all
else equal. The equivalent effect for bearishness is more significant; a submission is more than twice
as likely to be bearish if its author posted a bearish submission in the past. However, authors who
post a submission for the first time, or expressed equivocal sentiments in their previous post, are
significantly more likely to express a neutral opinion.
These estimates for the baseline do not vary substantially across the various specifications. We
present the remaining coefficients estimated for Eq. 2 in columns (3) and (4). Departing from the
baseline model, the data demonstrates that authors who previously commented on a bearish post
are 47.7% more likely to express bearish over neutral sentiments, and 18.1% less likely to express
bullish sentiments over neutral sentiments. Similarly, but less markedly, authors who previously
commented on at least one bullish submission are 9.4% more likely to write a bullish submission,
yet 11.3% less likely to write a bearish one. Comparable results are also observed for neutral posts.
The results offer strong evidence of the endogenous spread of sentiments between users. The
effect is more pronounced for assets with bearish outlooks. One hypothesis is that users rely on
discussions to time a potentially lucrative downturn in the price of an asset. Another is that panic
spreads faster, given that volatility is a big driver of uncertainty expressed in submissions. This is, in
part, supported by the spatial Durbin model detailed in Eq. 3. The estimated coefficients in columns
(5) and (6) imply that a submission is more likely to be bearish if the author commented on a submis-
sion made on a day the asset’s price was volatile. However, the coefficients in this specification are
not statistically significant. The precise driver of the asymmetry in buying versus selling decisions
requires deeper exploration.
Aggregate Opinion Formation One pertinent question is on the persistence of aggregate opinions.
This is of particular importance when considering market impact: do investors come to an agreement
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Table 3: WSB Sentiment Spillovers from the Leontieff Inverse
Dependent variable:
φi = −1 φi = +1 φi = −1 φi = +1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(I −W )−1φ+ −.13∗∗∗ (.04) .11∗∗∗ (.03) −.08 (.07) .08∗ (.05)
(I −W )−1φ0 −.22∗∗∗ (.04) −.13∗∗∗ (.03) −.23∗∗∗ (.08) −.14∗∗∗ (.05)
(I −W )−1φ− .30∗∗∗ (.06) −.10∗ (.05) −.001 (.11) −.24∗∗∗ (.09)
(I −W )−1Re −.07 (.17) .10 (.08) −.06 (.17) .10 (.08)
(I −W )−1R̃e −.05 (.04) −.01 (.02) −.05 (.04) −.01 (.02)
(I −W )−1σ 1.24∗∗ (.51) .36 (.36) 1.19∗∗ (.51) .34 (.36)
(I −W )−1φ+ ×φNA−1 −.08 (.08) .04 (.05)
(I −W )−1φ0 ×φNA−1 .01 (.09) .01 (.06)
(I −W )−1φ− ×φNA−1 .43
∗∗∗ (.13) .21∗∗ (.11)
m −.70∗∗∗ (.02) −.04∗∗∗ (.02) −.69∗∗∗ (.02) −.03∗ (.02)
AIC 169,963.5 169,961.3
McFadden’s R2 .01 .01
N 84,949 84,949
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: This table presents estimated log-odds coefficients for two multinomial logit models on the expressed sentiment in
WSB submissions, using extra variables to model bullish/bearish sentiment formation in Table 2. Odd columns estimate
the log-odds ratio of user i’s sentiment being bearish, φi = −1. Similarly, even columns estimate the ratio of user i’s
sentiment being bullish, φi = +1. Neutral submissions serve as the benchmark. The coefficients for the baseline variables,
which include the excess daily return, excess weakly return, volatility, and old sentiments by the same author, are not
documented here, since they do not change meaningfully.
about whether an asset should be bought or sold? We estimate this phenomenon through a parameter
α, which denotes the aggregate buying/selling intensity resulting from individual opinion formation.
One way gauge α is to replace matrix W in Eqs. 2-3 by its Leontief inverse, (I −W )−1. Instead of
a weighted average of i’s direct neighbours, the Leontief inverse returns the overall position of user i
in the network. While immediate neighbours are still highly weighted, the sentiments of their neigh-
bours, and those neighbours’ neighbours, feature as well. The end result is that (I −W )−1 captures
the sentiments related to an asset in the broader context of the whole forum, appropriately discount-
ing those further removed from i. Therefore, the Leontief inverse is better suited in measuring long
term fluctuations in aggregate sentiment.
The first two columns in Table 3 show the coefficients of Eq. 3, but with the adjacency matrix
replaced by its Leontief inverse, and the diagonal elements set to zero. The baseline coefficients
are suppressed, since they do not vary substantially from Table 2. The stark difference here is the
much stronger effect of volatility, (I −W )−1σ . It reflects a strong persistence of bearish sentiments in
discussions when the asset in question experiences volatility. In contrast to the statistically insignif-
icant coefficient on overall returns, (I −W )−1Re, volatility, and the panic it appears to induce, has a
powerful, propagating effect in the formation of investor opinions on WSB.
The final set of columns in Table 3 investigates whether sentiments detected in users who post
their first submission, versus those that have already expressed an opinion in the past, are noticeably
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different. The answer is in the affirmative; interacting the relevant dummy variable with the spillover
term, (I −W )−1φs ×φNA−1 , demonstrates that the large bearish spillovers take hold in users who post
for the first time. The original coefficient on (I −W )−1φ− is statistically insignificant in predicting
bearish over neutral sentiment.
4 Contagion, Consensus, and Asset Bubbles










i,t 0.004 (0.0001) 0.15 (0.004) 0.01 (0.0001)
Φ
0
i,t 0.002 (0.0001) 0.09 (0.003) 0.01 (0.0001)
Φ
−
i,t −0.01 (0.0002) −0.13 (0.01) −0.01 (0.0002)
Within-ticker Yes Yes Yes
Within-day Yes Yes Yes
N 14.4m 14.4m 14.4m
Adjusted R2 .0002 .0005 .001
Notes: This table presents OLS estimators for the correlation between aggregated daily sentiments, Φ+i,ts, on WSB, and
three stock market indicators as dependent variables. All variables are ‘within’-transformed to denote their deviations
from cross-sectional and temporal means. Subscript i denotes the asset, and t the trading day. Superscripts +, 0 and −
denote bullish, neutral and bearish sentiments, respectively. Corresponding standard errors are in parentheses. Column
(1) uses daily returns, calculated as the ratio of subsequent closing prices for assets i at times t and t − 1, as recorded
in CRSP, minus the risk free rate, as reported in K. French’s data library. Columns (2) and (3) regress the variation in
sentiment within asset i and time t on the within asset and time variations in log of trading volume. The same is done in
column (3) for the log-difference in daily intra-day high and low prices for asset i.
Do social interactions cause asset price fluctuations? In Section 3 we find that individuals rely on
their social connections for investment advice. Assets gain prominence on WSB over the course of
months, driven by a self-reinforcing social mechanism within the forum itself, rather than a change
in fundamentals. Herding and social dynamics appear to play a significant role in what people
consider for their investment portfolio. Discussions on WSB also impact the perception of future
asset returns. Users on the WSB forum change their sentiments about assets depending on the views
expressed by their peers. There is evidence that individuals come together and, on aggregate, reach
consensus, creating an environment where coordination and market impact is possible.
In this section, we begin by offering empirical evidence of the connection between sentiment
on WSB and asset returns. We subsequently propose a model for stock price changes due to social
contagion. We theoretically determine regimes which result in asset price stability and in volatility.
Simulations of the proposed model allow us to identify how asset prices evolve over time. Finally,
we extract a causal effect of WSB on financial markets through a Two-Stage-Least-Squares approach
modeling the effect of posting activity on trade volumes.
Sentiment on WSB and Asset Prices As a simple exercise, we define the total sentiment s on asset
i at time t, Φsi,t , as the number of submissions expressing sentiment s on the future price of asset
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i. To gauge the relationship between sentiments and the stock market, we are interested in asset
prices, volumes and volatilities. We proxy these with i) asset i’s daily rate of return in excess of
the risk-free rate, Rei,t , ii) i’s daily log trading volume, log(Vi,t), and iii) i’s log intra-day high-to-low
price range, log(PHi,t /P
L
i,t). Full details for the variable’s data sources and construction are available
in Appendix A.3. Since all variables display substantial cross-sectional and temporal heterogeneity,
instead of considering the raw variables described above, we look at their deviation from their cross-
sectional means at time t, as well as the temporal means for each asset i, as displayed in Table 4,
where the cross-sectional and temporal means, denoted by a bar, are subtracted from each variable.
This method is identical to introducing fixed effects.
Table 4 displays the results of a simple linear regression model, using least-squares fits, for each
of our stock market variables as dependent variables. Column (1) shows that sentiments Φsi,t corre-
late significantly with asset i’s daily excess returns: bullish posts relate to a positive return, neutral
posts to a somewhat lower positive return, and bearish posts to a negative return. The coefficient
for bearish returns is more pronounced: ten new bearish submissions on one asset, relative to the
cross-sectional and historical averages, relate to a 10% downturn in its price. Columns (2) and (3)
present two additional results of interest. Aggregate sentiments correlate significantly with the as-
sociated asset’s daily trading volume, as well as the intra-day trading range. Users on WSB display a
propensity to discuss volatile assets, with prospects of high returns, yet high risk. Interestingly, the
number of bearish posts correlates with lower relative trading volumes and intra-day price ranges,
suggesting some preference for bullish strategies.
These results do not indicate causation. While submissions likely raise attention to these assets,
alone they fail to gauge whether these movements follow fundamental shifts in the underlying value,
or simply an idiosyncratic rise in the demand for that asset.
4.1 Basic Framework
Table 4 demonstrates the strong connection between investor discussions on WSB and stock price
movements, but can these discussions shed light on the drivers behind asset price fluctuations? Be-
havioural economists have long deliberated the role that social interactions play in investment deci-
sions. This section models the key dynamics which emerge from social contagion to structure how
assets respond to social dynamics.
The best context to place the behaviour observed onWSB is within the behavioural finance frame-
work, separating market participants into ‘smart’ and ‘ordinary’ investors, as proposed in Shiller
(1984). The field largely evolved to understand the economic decision making process of ordinary
investors. Examples include Barberis & Huang (2009), who introduce a ‘narrow framing’ function
to reproduce gambling tendencies often observed in the context of stock market bubbles. A more
recent branch considers trend-following by ordinary investors, in what Barberis et al. (2018) label
as ‘extrapolation.’ Hommes (2021) provides a thorough review of the many dimensions in which
heterogeneous agents in stock markets are modelled, and the respective outcomes. The operating
framework of such models is to investigate the interaction between types of agents in a market, typ-
ically some smart or ordinary investors, obeying straightforward rules. These models are somewhat
distinct from a separate branch that seeks to understand ‘social herding,’ as discussed by Shiller
(2005, 2017), which more closely relate to the behaviour on the WSB forum. Investor crowding and
coordination is decomposed into two distinct effects in Kirman (1993). The interactions of groups
of investors with different sentiments in the marketplace is discussed in Bouchaud & Potters (2003),
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albeit at much shorter time scales than what is explored within this paper.
Proposed Approach Our goal is to evaluate how interactions affect asset price fluctuations, lever-
aging both our insights from WSB and the rich economic literature outlined above.
The intention is to incorporate the two key behaviours we observe empirically into a model of
asset price changes: i) contagion, i.e. a size effect by which investors, motivated through social con-
tagion, enter the market for one asset, and ii) consensus, i.e. an intensity effect capturing how well
these investors coordinate their buying/selling decisions. We observe that WSB discussions are fo-
cused around single assets, rather than portfolios of assets: in submissions that contain a ticker,
77% only mention a single ticker. Because of this, as well as simplicity, we model a unique asset in
isolation, and purposefully ignore broader market trends.
We are interested in separating out the behaviour of so-called ‘hype’ investors. Hype investors are
short-sighted, enticed by the idea of a quick buck; they are susceptible to social contagion, driven, in
part, by ‘gambler’s excitement’ à la Shiller (2005). The market impact of social contagion depends on
how many investors could potentially be swayed by their peers ‘to buy into the hype’. In our model,
we consider that a subset of investors is not swayed by social dynamics; they are grouped as ‘other’
investors.
The total market cap of an asset, pQ, is its price, p, times the number of shares outstanding, Q. It
is equal to the sum of shares held by hype investors, Y , and other investors, S :
pQ = p(Y + S). (4)
We attempt to model asset price changes in response to social contagion in the short term and, there-





There is a second, implicit assumption that the number of shares, Q, does not change with time.
For completeness, Appendix A.5 considers an alternative assumption whereby ‘other’ investors hold
constant the number of shares held.












where a dot denotes the derivative with respect to time t (we assume asset prices are differentiable).
The left hand side of Eq. 5 is the instantaneous rate of change of the asset price, determined by hype
investors’ asset demand on the right hand side. Y (p) is asset demand expressed as a function of price
p. For a given shock in demand, Eq. 5 includes a ‘market depth’ adjustment 1/pQ. Shocks to asset
price, driven by an exogenous rise in asset demand from hype investors, are the subject of this paper.
Bouchaud & Potters (2003) argue that the impact of an idiosyncratic rise in asset demand Y (p) is
linear on small time scales, where other investors fail to respond. Sustained for long enough, non-
hype investors may also be prompted to buy into an asset experiencing a pronounced demand shock.
We discuss developments on longer time scales in terms of demand elasticities among investors in
Appendix A.5. These yield interesting patterns, whereby investors feed off of each others’ price
responses. However, in this section we focus on the short-term developments as social contagion
spreads among hype investors, and thus abstract away the interaction between different investor
types.
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4.2 Model with Contagion and Consensus
We incorporate the insights from Section 3 into a model capturing how the observed consensus and
contagion dynamics impact asset prices. We consider that these dynamics govern the behaviour of
hype investors, Y.
Contagion We turn to an adapted Kermack-McKendrick SIR epidemic model to quantify the evo-
lution of asset demand via social contagion. This choice is justified through our results in Section
3.1 and empirically validated in Appendix A.7. We propose the following relationships between
susceptible, V , active/infected, A, and recovered, B, investors in a specific asset:
dV
dt
= −cAV , (6)
dA
dt




where c is the contagion rate, and r is the recovery rate. The total population of potential hype
investors, N = V +A+B, is assumed constant. We take this model literally to understand contagion
in asset interest on WSB. ‘Active’ users forgo passive investment, adopt a specific position in an asset,
and convince others to do the same. ‘Recovered’ users lose interest and cease to believe in the hype,
and thus close their asset-specific position. ‘Susceptible’ users have not yet taken any investment
action but could potentially become interested in the asset, as they seek investment advice from
their peers. We use A as an estimate for the number of hype investors in an asset at a certain point in
time.
Consensus The contagion model does not tackle the question of how active, hype investors form a
consensus on their expectation of the future price trajectory. In other words, it counts the number of
hype investors influenced by social contagion, but does not elaborate on their individual strategies.
To understand the buy/sell decisions influenced by social interaction, we turn to a model inspired
by Bouchaud & Potters (2003). Consistently with Section 3.2, we define φi as i’s opinion, which
embodies their expectation of the future price trajectory. We propose that individual investors use a
non-linear decision rule with respect to an individual’s ‘information signal’ χi to form a buy or sell
opinion about an asset:
φi = f (χi ) = f










• φi is the direction (buy/sell) that an investor chooses,
• mi is a term which captures social influence (its expanded form is given below),
• a is the degree of trend following,
• a′ is a stabilising component,
• b is an aversion for volatility.
The function f is a quantal response function:
f (χi ) =

+1, with probability eλ̂χi /(eλ̂χi +1)
−1, with probability 1/(eλ̂χi +1),
(8)
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with χi defined as before, λ̂ specifying the amount of noise (or ‘irrationality’) in the decision process
(with further discussions on λ̂ available in Bouchaud 2013).




wi,jφj + ηi , (9)
so that mi is updated from a prior state φi with weight wi,i , combined with new information from
neighbours j , weighted by wi,j , and idiosyncratic news ηi . Elements wi,j belong to the adjacency
matrix W , weighted by row totals, to produce a weighted average of information between social
connections of i (consistent with the definition of W in Section 3.2). wi,j is greater than zero if a
social connection exists between authors i and j ; it is zero otherwise. In the data, we estimate W by
observing whether the author of submission i commented on an older submission by j , for the same
asset.
Our approach is justified empirically in Section 3.2. We find that the variables outlined above
indeed have a statistically significant effect on the sentiment expressed by an individual about future
asset performance.
Aggregate Buying Intensity Given a definition for φi , we can derive the aggregate buying intensity
φ between all hype investors that are active in an asset at a given point in time. Since we are interested
in the overall impact that hype investors have on price, deriving a cumulative consensus dynamic is
of particular interest.
The formulation of individual φi as in Eq. 8 yields the following functional form for φ, computed










where the first equality stems from the fact that we are taking an average across identical Bernoulli
random variables; χ̂ is an estimate of the population average.
We substitute (â− â′) and b̂ as population equivalents of the weights in Eq. 7. Individual buy/sell
decisions are derived from the sentiments expressed by neighbors and aggregated by a single indi-
vidual through the adjacency matrix W , capturing how much an individual weights the opinion of
his neighbors, as described in the context of Eq. 9. Since all φi ’s are aggregated, the adjacency matrix
β̂W is subsumed by a multiplier α̂. The decision to subsume the adjacency matrix by a multiplier α̂
would yield an equality under certain assumptions on the connectivity matrix W , or an approxima-
tion in other cases. For example, if we assume a fully connected network, weights wij in Eq. 9 are
constant, allowing the connectivity to be perfectly captured by α̂.




















Asset Price Returns Driven by Contagion, and Consensus Armed with a model for how hype
investors enter the market for a specific asset (our contagion model) and for how they reach an
aggregate buying/selling intensity, we can proceed to model the price dynamics as a function of both
contagion and consensus.
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The growth in asset demand is the growth in buying intensity and of new investors joining exist-
ing traders. New investors join according to our proposed contagion model, which varies with time.
Consensus is formed both on the basis of time and asset price.






































































is the price elasticity of the buying intensity, and s = S/Q is the fraction of shares owned by non-
hype investors. The precise steps taken in the derivation are outlined in Appendix A.5. Our model
assumes that A,V vary slowly as compared to price. It also considers that price is continuous and can
be differentiated.
Eq.13 determines the change in price as a function of the rate at which new investors enter the
market, spurred by social contagion, and the rate of change in buying intensity. This allows us to
isolate the impact that social contagion has on price dynamics, while capturing the two fundamental
aspects of social contagion observed in the data, namely contagion and consensus. Further breaking















φ(cV − r) + φ̇
)
︸             ︷︷             ︸
(3) Demand
. (16)
Component (1), which we refer to as ‘capacity,’ is a market depth term, measuring how much
market power hype investors have as a share of the total market cap of the the stock. Component (2),
which we term ‘response,’ captures the price elasticity of hype investors weighted by the fraction of
shares owned by other investors s. Let us consider a simple exercise with components (1) and (2). As
the shares held by other investors approaches one (s goes to one), the price elasticity of the buying
intensity of hype investors ceases to matter. The response term approaches one at this limit, and
the price change is simply the extra money hype investors pour into the asset, divided by the total
nominal value of all shares. At the other extreme, as s approaches zero, all new shares are bought
from existing hype investors: the response term is now a function of the inverted price elasticity.
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Term (3) captures the interplay of two important forces: the rate at which new hype investors
enter the market for the asset and the overall change in buying intensity among the hype investors.
The first part of (3), φ(cV − r), quantifies how many active hype investors enter the market for the
asset. At the point of entry, these investors exert a buying intensity of φ. The second part of (3), φ̇,
captures the change in buying intensity.
4.3 Chaotic Prices from Coordinated Strategies
Impact of φ̇, εφ on Price Stability Our original derivations offer some insight into the primary
components that impact price, as explained after Eq. 16. The influence of certain variables appears
trivial to evaluate: for example, as A or M in Eq. 16 increase, social contagion will have greater
market impact. However, the relevance of φ̇, in Eq. 14, and εφ , in Eq. 15, is less obvious.
We turn to Hommes (2013) for an understanding of price stability, or instability. We consider
a scenario when hype investors begin to discuss a stock but no price impact has been felt (setting
ṗ/p = 0) and analyse the price dynamics that ensue. This system produces a stable steady state at
φ = 0 if λ̂α̂/2 ≤ 1, implying that investors are not connected enough for sentiments to amplify. In this
scenario, a small value for λ̂α̂/2 implies that consensus is difficult to reach. However, with λ̂α̂/2 > 1,
we arrive at a ‘pitchfork’ bifurcation, as described in Hommes (2013). The buying intensity produces
two stable steady states, φ+ > 0, φ− < 0, and one unstable steady state at φ0 = 0. These interesting
dynamics illustrate the potentially important effect of strong feedback in βW , as investors coordinate
to buy or sell the asset together.
Discrete Time Simulation We perform a discrete time simulation of our final model, presented in
Eq. 13. The key pattern of interest is the effect of a transitory increase in demand driven by hype on
the price of an asset. To this end, we simulate the following dynamical system:
At+1 =max[At + cVtAt − rAt ,A0] ,
Vt+1 = Vt − cVtAt ,

































where a subscript 0 denotes the starting value. The choices made to simulate the model include: i)
some fixed amount of hype investors, A0, are always present, with a buying intensity of φ0 = 0.1,
and ii) non-hype investors fix the nominal value of their investment, p0S0, as discussed earlier in this
section. In practice this implies that, hype investors enter the market to buy the asset (since φ0 > 0),
which other investors sell to them at a higher price. The price changes and coordination of buying
strategies affect the intensity with which hype investors purchase the asset in subsequent periods.
Gradually, they leave the market until only the starting amount A0 remain, and the price returns to
its ‘true’ value.
Since the focus is on asset demand by hype investors, we simulate various parameters for coor-














































(b) Impact on Price
Figure 7: Price Impact of Contagion and Opinion Dynamics; on the left, the number of active
investors in an asset increases steeply until time step 50, after which the number slowly declines to
its initial value (as ‘active’ investors ‘recover’). On the right, the price first increases until time step
50, after which it experiences a volatile crash, then returns to its initial level. Parameter values are
λ = 0.99, α = 0.45, a = 0.2, b = 0.5.
set to produce an equilibrium price of 1, and an equilibrium fraction of shares held by non-hype in-
vestors of 0.7: initial susceptible investors V0 = 200,000, initial active investors A0 = 30,000, initial
recovered investors B0 = 0, contagion rate c = 5 × 10
−7, and recovery rate r = 0.01. The pattern of
contagion produced is displayed in Figure 7a. At its peak, over 150,000 hype investors actively buy,
or sell, the asset, before returning to the initial value after 225 time steps. For the price dynamics,
the remaining inputs are for hype investor capital, M = 100, and number of shares, Q = 1,000,000.
Given the complex dynamics, qualitatively different patterns could be generated depending on
the choice of demand parameters. For the baseline, we pick values that are close to the data: λ = 0.99,
α = 0.45, a = 0.2, b = 0.5. The result, in Figure 7b, displays three important characteristics. The initial
increase in demand, until time step 50, gradually drives up price. Once this growth is depleted, the
price crashes dramatically, and extreme volatility persists until time step 150. At this stage, some
active investors still remain in the market, but the price follows a steady downward trend until it
reaches its initial level.
We test the prevalence of the slow initial price increase and sharp volatile drop across different
initialization choices for α, λ, a, b. The results are presented in Appendix A.6. Certain elements of
the price dynamics appear to change: the period of price volatility and magnitude (in percentage
terms) of price drop. However, we observe that all initialization choices result in a slow, steady
run-up in price followed by a crash and period of volatility.
Key Implications for Price Stability Our proposed model and simulations imply that social con-
tagion has a destabilizing effect on markets. Excitement about an asset is slow to take off, however,
coordination among investors gradually moves the price. This manifests in the slow run-up in price
in our simulation, driven by the gradual increase in active hype investors due to contagion. As shown
in Section 2.2, fear of downside spreads faster than optimism to the upside. Individuals eventually
begin to doubt the value of an asset; panicked selling and volatility ensue.
24




i,t σi,t σi,t Qi,t Qi,t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Ai,t 0.0001
∗ 0.0001∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.0005∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.01) (0.01)
φi,t−1 −0.002
∗∗ −0.002∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.12) (0.06)
α 0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ −0.03∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ −0.41∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.01) (0.01)
Method Pooled Within Pooled Within Pooled Within
R2 0.0004 0.0004 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.29
Adjusted R2 0.0003 0.0004 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.29
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: This table presents coefficients of the linear model in Eq. 17 for new authors on WSB discussing asset i in calen-
dar week t, ∆Ai,t , and the average sentiment expressed about asset i in the previous week t − 1, φi,t−1 fitted to data on
three stock market variables: excess returns Rei,t , volatility in excess returns σi,t , and nominal trading volumes, vi,t . All
regressions use 64,698 observations. Models denoted as ‘Pooled’ under Method are estimated using a regular OLS. Where
the Method is ‘Within’, an OLS regression is run on the within-week and within-ticker fluctuation in all dependent an
independent variables.
4.4 Evidence of Market Impact
Given our model in Section 4.3, we hypothesize that a causal relationship exists between the conta-
gion mechanism within WSB and financial variables. In this section, we substantiate this hypothesis.
We select three dependent market variables of interest: i) the average excess rate of return of asset i
in week t, Rei,t , ii) the standard deviation of excess returns in week t, σi,t , and iii) the nominal trading
volume of asset i in week t, Qi,t , in billions of USD. Our independent variables of interest are i) the
number of new, unique authors posting about asset i in week t, ∆Ai,t , and ii) the average sentiment
expressed about asset i in the previous week t − 1, φi,t−1 (taking value −1 if all are bearish, and +1 if
all are bullish). Our goal is to isolate how hype investor interest in an asset impacts market variables.
For this section, we restrict the analysis to tickers mentioned over 30 times, and to submissions made
from 2016 onward, for adequate coverage in our contagion variables.
We begin with a simple OLS approach to the following linear model:
Yi,t = α +κ∆Ai,t +γφi,t−1 +ui,t , (17)
where Yi,t is the target variable of choice, α is a constant and ui,t is the error term. The columns
denoted by the ‘Pooled’ method in Table 5 report the estimated OLS coefficients from Eq. 17. In
the columns labeled by the ‘Within’ method, all variables are de-meaned with respect to time t and
ticker i, to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Unlike in Table 1, all variables are also de-meaned
with respect to each ticker’s temporal average. This is identical to adding fixed effect dummies for
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tickers and weeks.
The effects seemmost pronounced for price volatility and nominal trading volume: ten new users
are associated with an increase in the standard deviation of 0.005 in the within-group specification,
and an average of $80 million extra trading volume relative to other tickers or weeks. The coefficients
on excess returns are small and not statistically significant, so there is little indication that WSB
activity was able to push prices significantly in our sample.
Even though the OLS approach offers some intuition, it does not say much on the causal effect
of WSB activity on the market, much like for Table 4. In Section 3.2, we show that sentiments
expressed by individuals are formed both on the basis of social interactions, and recent stock returns
and volatility. Therefore, there is a simultaneity problem: we are unable to gauge whether WSB
activity affected movements in an asset at time t, or whether this WSB activity is driven by the very
action in the asset we are trying to explain.





∗∗ (0.0000) 0.0001∗∗∗ (0.0000) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.01)
φi,t−1 −0.002 (0.001) 0.01
∗∗∗ (0.001) 0.12∗∗ (0.05)
α −0.001∗∗∗ (0.0001) −0.03∗∗∗ (0.0001) −0.41∗∗∗ (0.01)
FS F-statistic 28.93 28.93 28.928
J-statistic 0.002 88.702 0.115
R2 −0.001 0.005 0.29
Adjusted R2 −0.001 0.005 0.29
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Notes: This table presents coefficients of our 2SLS model in Eqs. 17-18 for the predicted new authors on WSB discussing
asset i in calendar week t, ∆Âi,t , and the average sentiment expressed about asset i in the previous week t −1, φi,t−1 fitted
to data on three stock market variables: excess returns Rei,t , volatility in excess returns σi,t , and nominal trading volumes,
vi,t . All regressions use 64,698 observations. We use the number of authors who commented in the preceding three weeks,
as well as average price returns in previous week, as instrumental variables for the number of new authors. The within-
transformation is applied to all variables, with respect to tickers i and weeks t. FS F-statistic denotes the F-statistic on the
first-stage regression, testing whether the coefficients on the instrumental variables are simultaneously equal to zero.
To answer the question of causality, we implement a rudimentary Two-Stage-Least-Squares (2SLS)
estimator. This approach considers only the variation in WSB activity exogenous to current stock
market movements as a predictive variable. Given the dynamics we observe in Section 3, past WSB
activity is a strong predictor of current WSB activity.
The first-stage regression is
∆Ai,t = c + β1Ai,t−1 + β2R
e
i,t−1 + εi,t , (18)
where ∆Ai,t is the number of new authors who posted a submission discussing asset i in calendar
week t, Ai,t−1 is the stock of unique authors who posted a submission discussing asset i in calendar
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weeks t − 3 to t − 1, Rei,t−1 is the average excess rate of return of asset i in calendar week t − 1, c is
a constant, and εi,t is an error term. We justify the choice of instruments as a reduced version of
the specification in column (3) of Table 1. Specifically, there is the simple contagion effect stemming
from the stock of users who discussed asset i in the preceding three weeks, and a sentiment effect
captured by the change in price of asset i in the previous week.
The second stage is the target equation in Eq. 17, used to determine the impact of WSB on
financial markets. The key detail is that, ∆Ai,t takes the fitted values from the first-stage regression
in Eq. 18, which we denote by ∆Âi,t . In essence, these are the ‘hype’ investors expected to start
conversations because of previous discussions they participated in, instead of any ‘news.’ The first
key assumption is that the instruments in Eq. 18 are uncorrelated with the error term ui,t . In other
words, WSB activity in the past is not affected by market variables today. The second key assumption
is that the stock of authors and lagged excess returns in Eq. 18 hold significant predictive power.
Table 6 presents the results from the 2SLS regression. The instrumental variables, as well as
the dependent variables, are de-meaned by cross-sectional and temporal averages. The first-stage
F-statistic, reported in the bottom part of Table 6 indicates that the instruments perform well in the
2SLS model.
The results presented in Table 6 are intuitive. As it stands, the little signal we get for price returns,
in column (1), suggests a negative relationship between hype investors and price returns. While we
try to control for sentiments in the previous week, φi,t−1, the coefficient is statistically insignificant.
One simple reason is that price returns are fast moving, whereas the contagion dynamics we model
are slow. Discussions on any particular asset take months before peaking in size, as we demonstrate
in Figure 5.
We would expect volatility to increase due to hype investors, which is supported by the results in
column (2). However, judging by the J-statistic, our instruments do not appear valid in this particular
instant. This is likely due to autocorrelation in asset price volatility, which is therefore codetermined
with regards to past WSB activity.
Even though it is difficult to determine what direction a stock will move due to hype investors,
one relationship is clear: as new investors enter the market for an asset, trading volumes increase.
The relationship that is most pronounced from our 2SLS is that of new authors on WSB and nominal
trading volume, as illustrated in column (3) in Table 6. This implies that our proposed contagion
mechanism does, in fact, play a significant role in driving trading activity in an asset. As a reality
check, we plot fitted values for two stocks, AMD and MU, in Figure 1, which highlights the trading
activity capture by our model.
Furthermore, as dictated by our earlier model, the number of shares held by non-hype investors
is an important factor which we do not account for in these regressions, except for a level-effect in
the within-transformation. Simply, the impact κ in Eq. 17 may vary by i. Consider two simple
examples. At the start of 2020, the WSB subreddit boasted approximately 800 thousand users11,
giving a potential purchasing power of $8 billion (assuming a purchasing power of $10,000 for each
WSB user12). Taking Apple Inc. as an example stock, even if all of WSB were to purchase this
asset simultaneously, the price impact is unlikely to have been large, given Apple’s market cap of
$1.3 trillion, as of January 2nd, 2020. In contrast, GameStop had a market cap of approximately
$1.3 billion in January 2021, by which time WSB was frequented by 1.8 million users13, yielding a
potential purchasing power of $18 billion. Under a heavily simplified scenario, by which these users
buy all shares available, this reflects an almost 14-fold increase in the price of GameStop equity
(GME). At its highest price point, GME rose from $19 to $347 in January 2021, achieving an 18-fold
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price increase.
Even though it is difficult to determine what direction a stock will move due to hype investors,
one relationship is clear: trading volumes increase with new hype investors entering the market. The
results in column (3) of Table 6 suggests that 100 new users in WSB, introduced via social contagion,
lead to an average increase in trading volumes of $9 billion, relative to other tickers and weeks.
This implies that social contagion plays a significant role in driving trading activity in an asset. As
an example, we plot fitted values for two stocks, AMD and MU, in Figure 1, highlighting that the
model captures some important features of market activity of these two stocks. Of particular note
are the cycles in hype investors, which fit the social contagion paradigm: excitement about AMD,
for instance, rises over several weeks, then, as the number of users involved peaks, participants get
bored and turn to discussing other assets. Eventually, a new catalyst, or the intake of new users,
starts the cycle anew. Naturally, these users alone are unlikely to be the sole reason for elevated
trading activities. Rather, WSB is likely a robust sample of retail investors’ moods in a broader
market setting, off of which institutional investors also conduct their own trades.
5 Conclusion
Our analysis documents two empirical findings: (i) ‘contagion’ and (ii) ‘consensus’ among retail
investors. We test for contagion in asset interest in two different ways. Our results consistently show
that investors become interested in discussing an asset, not because of fundamentals, but because
other users discuss it. Subsequently, this paper tests whether an individual’s sentiment about future
asset performance are affected by those of others. We find that this is the case: people look to their
peers to form an opinion about an asset’s potential. Furthermore, this relationship is not symmetric:
downside panic appears to spread from one individual to the next more quickly than enthusiasm
about upside potential.
Is it possible to draw some conclusion about how asset prices change with respect to these dy-
namics? To that end, this paper introduces a model that decomposes investor asset demand due to
social dynamics into i) hype around an asset caused by contagion and ii) opinion formation leading
to overall consensus to buy/sell. The model indicates that, when investors are not very connected and
consensus is difficult to reach, prices remains stable. However, as feedback among investors plays a
greater role, the price impact is larger. This is verified through simulation, which indicates that the
price will gradually increase as hype spreads, but eventually become highly unstable and crash. The
price crash stems from panic selling, as investors turn nervous in the face of volatility. The connec-
tion between WSB and market activity is further validated using an instrumental variable approach.
We find that WSB activity, exogenous to price movements, is able to explain significant variance in
nominal trading volumes.
There are many questions that our analysis does not address. Causality is hard to establish, in
the absence of investment records. A more detailed analysis, potentially directly linking discussions
with investments by individuals is one area of future investigation. Recent research highlights that
contagion and ‘news shocks’ result in distinct purchasing patterns on Amazon Deschatres & Sornette
(2005). It may be possible to decompose asset demand into ‘hype-driven’ and ‘news-driven’ demand
offering a deeper understanding of what drives market volatility.
This research prompts us to inquire about the fate of ‘homo economicus’ – the rational individ-
ual who synthesizes all information. The observed behaviours withinWSB can shed light on whether
traditional economic assumptions are empirically valid. Considering that individuals look towards
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their immediate neighbours to determine lucrative investment opportunities, with hype as an im-
portant factor in decision-making, the ‘homo economicus’ may lack some important attributes to
describe the modern investor. Finally, the financial markets do not exist in isolation: investor deci-
sions have broader implications on the cost of capital. It is important to evaluate how the influence
of hype investors will percolate through the economy.
As social media galvanizes a larger pool of retail investors with the potential for exciting stock
market gambles, it is crucial to understand how social dynamics can impact asset prices. With the
first publicly acclaimed victory of Main Street over Wall Street, in the form of the GameStop short
squeeze, it is unlikely that socially-driven asset volatility will simply disappear. In fact we observe
the opposite: WSB grew from approximately 1.8 million users at the start of January 2021 to over
10 million users in April 2021.14 Overall, the newly available data on WSB and changing investing
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A Appendix
A.1 Tickers Mentioned on WSB
Table 7: Most Frequent Ticker Mentions
Ticker Name Comment Count Submission Count Sum
SPY S&P 500 Index 243,572 7,925 251,497
AMD Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. 121,249 5,555 126,804
TSLA Tesla, Inc. 107,987 5,419 113,406
MU Micron Technology, Inc. 84,301 3,879 88,180
AAPL Apple Inc. 44,588 1,794 46,382
AMZN Amazon.com, Inc. 41,316 1,441 42,757
SNAP Snap Inc. 39,509 1,988 41,497
MSFT Microsoft Corporation 38,181 1,630 39,811
NVDA NVIDIA Corporation 35,282 1,502 36,784
SPCE Virgin Galactic Holdings, Inc. 28,061 1,509 29,570
FB Facebook, Inc. 24,265 1,360 25,625
DIS The Walt Disney Company 22,442 991 23,433
BYND Beyond Meat, Inc. 22,232 860 23,092
NFLX Netflix, Inc. 20,427 921 21,348
JNUG Direxion Daily Jr Gld Mnrs Bull 3X ETF 15,323 1,072 16,395
GE General Electric Company 15,097 890 15,987
RAD Rite Aid Corporation 14,623 828 15,451
SQ Square, Inc. 12,866 788 13,654
JD JD.com, Inc. 11,529 585 12,114
USO United States Oil 11,263 581 11,844
Conventionally, submissions or comments that mention a ticker will spell it using uppercase let-
ters, or following a dollar sign. However, a challenge is that not all uppercase words are valid tickers.
A first match is made by identifying any succession of two to five capital letters. Subsequently, we
used a pre-determined list, scraped from Yahoo Finance and Compustat, to check whether a match
is indeed present in the available financial data. Some abbreviations or capitalised words which are
not valid tickers might still show up, such as ‘USD’ (ProShares Ultra Semiconductors), ‘CEO’ (CNOOC
Limited), and ‘ALL’ (The Allstate Corporation). Single characters also appear, such as ‘A’ (Agilent Tech-
nologies, Inc.). We manually created list of such tickers, and ignored featured matches, to build a
preliminary list of candidates. We refined a second list of candidates by checking whether a collec-
tion of one to five letters, lower or uppercase, is preceded by a dollar sign. Any mention of ‘$CEO’ or
‘$a’ counts as ‘CEO’ and ‘A’, respectively. We checked these extracts again against the scraped list of
available tickers.
A.2 BERT Performance
We trained BERT on 90% of the labelled data, and used the remaining 10% for validation. Figure
8 plots two confusion matrices, one to test the performance of BERT out-of-sample, then in-sample.
For the out-of-sample test, in Figure 8a, we only train BERT on 80% of the available data, then plot



























































































(b) In-Sample Predictions, N = 258
Figure 8: Confusion Matrices for WSB Sentiments using BERT: On the right, BERT is trained 80%
of training data, and the performance is tested on the remaining 20% of training data; the algorithm
performs well in differentiating between neutral and bearish submissions, but not so well in identi-
fying bullish submissions. On the left, BERT is trained on all available data, and the performance
is checked on the 10% of observations used for validation. Here, the algorithm performs better at
identifying bullish submissions.
between neutral and bearish submissions, the classification of bullish sentiments suffers in this in-
stance. However, when all the data is made available, the in-sample predictions, plotted in Figure
8b, are much better. This is likely a combination of a larger training set, as well as the data being
used for validation against alternative models. The results are satisfactory; BERT correctly classifies
69% of ticker submissions in the validation set as neutral, bullish or bearish. This is better than a
LASSO regression’s accuracy, which we do not cover here.
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A.3 Data Appendix
Besides the scraped text data from Reddit, we downloaded historical price series on extracted tickers
from The Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP). The time period, denoted by t, is defined as
the 24 hours between closing times on the New York Stock Exchange, namely 4pm EST. For example,
a submission made on Tuesday at 5pm EST was categorised in the same time frame as a submission
made on the following Wednesday at 10am. This is to mitigate any influence news occurring outside
market hours might have on conversations in WSB. The choice of timing may not be consistent with
non-US stock markets, but, given that almost all discussed assets are US stocks and indices, this does
not affect the results. In all, the financial data used are Pi,t , the dollar price of security i at closing
time of day t, R
f





the intra-day high and low prices of security i at closing time of day t, and Vi,t , the trading volume
of security i at closing time of day t.
We computed the variables for Table 1 as follows:








, where d is a day in calendar week t, Pi,d is the closing price of asset
i on day d, and R
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d is the daily risk free rate on day d,and E computes the arithmetic mean of
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i,t−1)2, where Rei,t denotes the average excess return observed be-
tween days t and t − 10,
• W is the normalised submission adjacency matrix, where wi,j is equal to the number of com-
ments made by i’s author on an older submission j with the same extracted ticker, divided by
the total number of comments made by i’s author on older submissions with the same extracted
ticker,
• as denotes a dummy variable for a submission with sentiment s, where s can be bullish (s = +1),
bearish (s = −1) or neutral (s = 0),
• as−1 denotes a dummy, as above, for the sentiment of the last post made by the author on the
same extracted ticker, where aNA−1 represents the lack of such a submission.
We took two extra cleaning steps. First, to account for stock splits and mergers, we use CRSP’s
cumulative factors to adjust prices and volumes for each security i. Second, we remove any instances
where the price is negative, or the excess return is greater than 10.
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Figure 9: Top 20 External Subreddits Frequented byWSBUsers; the plot shows the percent of WSB
users who are externally active (posted on an external subreddit) who have posted on the subreddit
labeled at the bottom of the chart.
Distance Calculation and Matching The matching on observables exercise attempts to isolate the
impact that discussions on the WSB forum have on generating new discussions about the same asset.
It attempts to isolate the ”endogenous” component for asset interest. In order to accomplish this, it
is important to control for several factors:
i Whether users have the same activity profile on the forum: a user who is extremely active (rou-
tinely writes many comments and posts) may be more likely write a post about an asset than one
who is less engaged
ii Whether users are exposed to the same market environment: a user may post about an asset due
to its market activity rather than because of discussions on the forum
iii A user’s ”choice” to comment on one post versus another driven by previous asset interests
In order to control for these, we develop distance metrics to match users who comment on a post
about a certain stock with those who do not, but exhibit similar characteristics otherwise - the more
similar two users are in a specific fact, the lower their distance metric would be. Distance metrics are
developed based on the following criteria to tackle the issues presented above:
i Whether two users are active on the WSB forum for approximately the same time period and
whether they have similar commenting or posting characteristics in the forum
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ii How shortly after a post about is made are users active on the forum: if two users are active on
the forum at approximately the same point in time, they would be exposed to a similar market
environment at the time of their activity
iii Similar interests external to the WSB subreddit: certain user adopt more targeted interests and
are active on forums such as “weedstocks” or “TeslaMotors”. These may correlate to which assets
they are prone to be interested in. A plot of the top 20 external subreddits ranked by the number
of unique WallStreetBets users who have posted on them, is presented for the interested user
in Figure 9. It is important to note that this analysis uses external posts to compute similarity
metrics. A more comprehensive analysis of external interest can be done by combining external
comment and post data, however, commenting data across Reddit has a prohibitively large size
for analysis at this stage. In order to compare user’s external activity, we match users based on
the 20 subreddits they are most active in during the month of the submission they comment
on. Several studies show that users change subreddit interests over time and, for this reason, we
choose to match on external interests at a specific point in time.
In practice, this translates to the following matching exercise:
1. We matched individuals from the treatment group to all Redditors active (who have either
posted or commented) on WSB (excluding those in the treatment group) who became active on
the forum during the same month
2. We filtered out individuals in the potential control group whose last activity (post or com-
ment) on the forum occurred before the submission that was commented on by their match in
the treatment group (filtering out individuals who have become inactive before our period of
interest finishes)
3. We filtered out individuals who create over 500 posts in a month as we discovered most such
users to be bots; this only eliminate 0.015% of WSB users
4. Lastly, we filtered out individuals in the potential control group who have posted about a ticker
before the time of the relevant submission. This indicates that the individual is already inter-
ested in the ticker and the events surrounding our submission of interest would have no effect
5. We then calculated the behavioural distance between a ticker commenter and the remaining
potential matched control group using several distance metrics:
D1: the time between the submission the commenter interacted with and the next activity of the
member of the control group. One of the main sources of homophily in this study is the appearance
of news or market moves by a particular ticker. Section 2.2 shows a strong correlation between asset
returns sentiment and posting volumes. We controlled for this by making sure that a member of
the control group was active shortly after the time of the relevant submission in order to have been
exposed to the same market and news environment at the time of their activity
D1 =minti,j>sk [ti,j − sk ,30 days] (19)
where ti,k ∈ times of activity of j (a member of control group), sk is the time of the submission a
member of the treatment group, k, commented on. We add 30 days to the minimization because if an
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individual is active after over 30 days from a given post, the market will have changed substantially
and they are likely not exposed to the same market events
D2: the average comment and submission length on WSB
D3: the average comment and submission amount on WSB
D4: the difference in the number of external subreddits that both individuals posts on (a measure
of how many external interests each individual has)
D5: the overlap, in percentage terms, in the number of external subreddits the two individuals
are both interested
D6: the difference in the average number of posts each individual makes on external subreddits
(a measure of how active, on average, each individual is within external communities)
6. We normalized all distance variables Di between [0,1] using min-max normalization, summed
them (D =D1+D2+D3+D4+D5+D6) and computed their inverse (1/D) to use this as our final
metricMi,j between a member of the control, i, and member of the treatment group, j . A small
M would imply that two individuals are a poor match, a large M implies that they are a good
match.
If the individual comments on multiple submissions, the D1 metric was computed separately
for each submission the individual comments on in order to control for potential exposure to
each market event. For individuals who commented on over five different submissions, we
considered only the most recent five submissions for the purposes of the distance calculation,
in order to proxy recent activity and market events which may have prompted asset interest.
For someone who comments on four submissions, the distance calculation between them and a
member of the control group would be computed as: D =D11+D12+D13+D14+D2+D3+D4+D5.
7. Lastly, we solved the following maximal-matching optimization problem in order to match








xi,j ≤ 1 ∀i ∈N,
∑
i
xi,j ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ T ,
0 ≤ xi,j ≤ 1 ∀N,T ,
xi,j ∈ Z ∀N,T ,
(20)
where N stands for our control group, T stands for our treatment group.
Practically, even though this is an integer program, we can drop the last integrality constraint.
A question that might arise is what the distribution in specific distance values (D1, ...D6) is, and
whether, even though over distanceD is minimized, the individual distances can take on large values.
We examine the max-min normalized distributions and observe that, even though it is possible for
individual distances to take on large values, empirically this occurs rarely as there are a sufficient
number of potential users to match with to ensure all criteria are well-matched against. Empirical
details are available upon request.
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Figure 10: Estimated Effect of Commenting on Posting a New Submission; the distribution of the




j , across the top 1% of tickers is graphed as a
series of box plots. The solid line connects the median estimate, and the protruding dashes represent
the 5th and 95th percentiles.
Evaluating Impact of Commenting The effect of commenting on a post on future probability to
create a post, displayed in Figure 6, appears small in absolute terms because there is one order of
magnitude more comments than submissions. Figure 10 presents the ratio of proportion, π̂Tj /π̂
C
j ,
estimates as a function of the frequency with which a user has commented. The first important result
highlighted is that all differences in proportion are positive, implying that engaging in discussions on
WSB about an asset strictly increases future interest in the asset. This effect becomes more prominent
the more a user comments on ticker-related posts, evidencing some form of threshold contagion in
investor interest spread. For this portion of the analysis, we filter out instances when no members of




Longer Time Scales and Elasticities of Demand On longer scales, larger bull runs form, depend-
ing on the responsiveness of smart and ordinary investors to price changes. To see this, write Y (p),




so that the adjustment in shares held by smart investors is purely endogenous with respect to price.





















is the price elasticity of demand for smart investors. We denote s = S/Q, the ratio of shares owned by
smart investors. Eq. 21 demonstrates that prices may shoot off indefinitely if, between all investors,
increasing prices fail to trigger enough shareholders to sell. A crash would only take place once
enough investors decide to increase their response to higher prices, causing a sign reversal in Eq. 21,
and a subsequent rout. This type of model, where the responsiveness of agents’ demand to price
varies, is studied extensively by Hommes (2013), and so we do not dwell on it here.
Herding and Investor Clusters This papers offers a deeper exposition of asset demand by ordinary
investors by introducing the effect of consensus among ordinary investors, and its consequences on
price stability. To that end, the particular appeal of social dynamics is in producing movements large
enough to overcome the market depth bottleneck, detailed in Eq. 4 in its simplest form. To see this,





where Φ replaces Y as total demand, to reflect individual demand φi taking values −1 should i sell,
0 if they are neutral, and +1 if they buy. There is an implicit assumption that all investors i have
the same purchasing power, which we will denote M ; while unrealistic, we make this simplifying
assumption to highlight the impact of consensus. From Eq 5, it is obvious that individual ordinary
investors, controlling an infinitesimally small fraction of the supply Y , are unable to translate their
trades into large price movements. However, should investors be linked, such that they coordinate





whereby ordinary investors are organised into C clusters of size L(C), trading in direction φC . This is
where our simplifying assumption is useful: heterogeneity in investor size implies that certain clus-
ters emerge from large investors, confusing the effect of consensus by which many small investors i
can form an equally-sized clusters. Therefore, this formulation highlights social dynamics, i.e. inter-
actions between individuals, as the mechanism for ordinary investors to drive market fluctuations.
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where we take the partial derivative of A, and break down the derivative of φ with respect to time



















































































φ[cV − r] + φ̇
)
. (22)
which gives us the components (1), (3), (4) on the right hand side of our equation as outlined in
section 4.3. Recall that
pQ = pY + pS,
and denote s = S/Q, the proportion of shares owned by smart-money investors. Finally, the ordinary
investor asset demand identity holds, pY = φMA, such that the total value of shares owned by or-
dinary investors (pY ) equals the number of active ordinary investors in the market, A, the average
amount of money they hold, M , and their buying intensity φ. Thus, we rearrange the the identity
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A.6 Asset Price Simulation
As we discussion in Section 4.3, our model can reproduce a diverse set of patterns. In this section,


















































(d) b = 0.6
Figure 11: Price Dynamics; these four plots demonstrate the qualitative changes in the price dy-
namics after slight alternations of each parameter. The baseline parameters are λ = 0.99, α = 0.45,
a = 0.2, b = 0.5. The alternations in each figure is noted in the caption.
Figures in 11 reproduce Figure 7 with slight changes to demand parameters. In all cases, the
initial price increase remains. The qualitative results are broadly summarised as follows: i) an in-
crease in coordination through λ produces a sharper crash, and faster recovery, ii) higher demand
persistence α produces larger oscillations during the crash, iii) more trend following a produces big-
ger, sporadic price spikes, which are more sensitive to price acceleration, and iv) higher aversion to
volatility b produces a sharper crash, but faster and stable recovery.
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A.7 Contagion Model






























































Figure 12: Ticker Activity versus OverallWSBActivity; the number of unique monthly active users
(users who comment or post) on the left y-axis plotted plotted against the unique number of posters
about a specific ticker (on the right y-axis). Both are plotted as 3-month rolling means.
Empirical evidence for the contagion model We provide evidence that discussions about assets
are self-perpetuating on WSB: social contagion appears to play a role in the assets that investors
discuss and consider for their portfolios. Here, we attempt to reconcile the size of discussions on
WSB over time with our contagion model of choice.
We observe that some of the most commonly mentioned tickers appear to exhibit a hump-shaped
pattern of number of interested users over time. Figure 12 shows the number of authors interested
in a given ticker, aggregated on a monthly basis, versus the overall number of unique users active
on WSB. Unique ticker interest shows a more ‘bursty’ and hump-shaped pattern which, at times, is
distinct from the overall trend of number of users active on the forum. We use data from WSB to
estimate our contagion parameters, c and r, at different points in time and show that our simple con-
tagion model captures the hump-shaped ticker interest. One challenge is that our epidemic model
is well-suited to model a single “outbreak” in ticker interest as it assumes a static population. We,
therefore, look at how well our model fits data with non-overlapping periods of discussion intensity.
Appendix A.7 offers insight into how parameters are initialized and into model sensitivity.
Figure 13 shows the predicted discussion sizes of specific tickers from the contagion model (as a
percent of active users on the forum at the time) versus the actual sizes of ticker discussions on the
WSB forum. Despite its clear shortcomings, this simple model that is tuned on noisy global param-
eters still captures the overall shape of social contagion in ticker interest. It exhibits some desirable
properties, such as the fact that contagion spreads more slowly in communities that are sparse and
faster as the community grows: consider Figure 13a where JNUG interest gradually permeated the
forum over the course of a year, whereas TSLA interest in 2020, displayed in Figure 13d, spread to a
much greater population over the course of three months.
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Figure 13: Contagion Model Forecasts for Active Investors in Assets on the WSB Forum; the con-
tagion model is initialized with the parameters at the start of an “outbreak” of activity on WSB in a
specific ticker and used to approximate the growing interest and, subsequent, loss of interest.
Estimating c and r Parameters Globally Certain contagion variables are more straightforward to
estimate from WSB data than others. For the moment, we assume the total population at a given
time, Nt , to be the number of active users on the forum: those who comment or post at time t. The
number of users initially interested in asset i, Ai,0, is estimated as the number of people who post
about i in some starting period 0. The average dollar amount each user has at there disposal, M , can
tweaked from available surveys15. All of these are adjusted to check the results’ sensitivity.
Contagion parameters, c and r, require more care in isolating the effect of social interaction from
other variables that may impact asset interest.
The contagion rate is comprised of two parameters:
c = τγ, (23)
where τ is transmissibility, the probability of transmission of asset interest given contact between
a passive and active investor), and γ the average rate of contact between passive and active investors
on the forum. The first, τ is easily estimated from the results in Figure 6, showing a spread of ticker-
specific interest at a rate of 1.1% in the single treatment group category. In order to estimate γ , we
counted the total number of unique users who commented on a submission, on average (this is an
approximation for the number of ”susceptible” individuals that an infected person comes in contact
with), multiplied by the number of posts that a user makes, on average, about a given ticker, and
divided by the number of users active on the forum, measured as unique users who post a submis-
sion or comment, while the submissions about the ticker are discussed on the forum. We consider
interactions to be uniform over the duration of the ”infectious period” so divide this number by the
43
duration. The average contact rate is estimated at γ = 1.2×10−4%. This may seem particularly small,
however, intuitively this is not surprising as gamma captures how many people will pay attention to
a single submission versus all the other content in a thriving online community. The contact rate also
differs greatly from one month to the next as people join and leave the forum, so this rate is more
precisely tracked This returns a combined contagion rate of c = 9.8× 10−7.
Estimating r presents a challenge: users do not advertise a loss of interest in an asset on WSB.
In order to estimate the recovery rate, we turn to its classic definition as ‘the inverse of the infec-
tious period,’ as described in Ridenhour et al. (2018). We consider the ‘infectious period’ the time
difference between when an author make his first post about a ticker and the time when his last post
ceases to receive comments (ceases to be actively discussed on the forum). During this period, an
individual spreads their perspective about an asset on the forum. We estimate the recovery rate at
approximately r = 1/19.6 = 5.1×10−2. Further details on estimates for contagion parameters and the
sensitivity of the model are presented in the following section.
Initializing c, r, N0 and A0 for Social Contagion in a Specific Ticker We initialize N0 as the
total number of unique authors who are active on the forum from the start to 5 months after the
beginning of the contagion: we select this period in order to estimate the size of the population who
would be affected by the excitement about a ticker, but we make the period sufficiently short so as to
avoid capturing inflated population numbers driven by user churn (when a group of users becomes
uninterested in a given subreddit and is replaced by a new group of users). We initiate the A0, the
initial population that begins to discuss a ticker on the forum driving further interest, as the average
number of of unique authors posting about the ticker in the 3 months preceding the uptick. We also
adjust gamma to be calculated at the time the uptick begins.
Units and Further Discussion on Initialization of Parameters We check our contagion units with
the standard epidemeology literature and intuition. The change equations in Eq. 6 should result in a
unit of:
persons
day . We consider our input into the c constant; we know that A,V have a units of persons×
persons, therefore our c constant must have units of 1person−day . Our c constant is composed of τ and
γ . γ helps us quantify how many contacts occur between passive and active individuals each day; τ
tells us what proportion of the passive investors become active as a result. τ is a unitless constant as
it is in persons who become active divided by persons contacted in total, or
persons
persons . The γ×AV should
give us the total contacts between passive and active per day in units
person
day . γ should give us, for
every active individual, on a given day they are active, what is the probability that a passive person
comes in contact with them (in units of 1 divided by person × day)? Subsequently, γ × A would
give us the number of active investors that a single passive investor comes into contact with each
day. Finally, γ ×AV would give us the total contacts between the two. We, therefore approximate
γ with this in mind. The γ parameter is sometimes referred to as the fraction of active individuals
that a passive individual comes in contact with. However, on the WSB forum, the fraction of active
individuals is relatively small compared to the overall population. We therefore estimate the fraction
of active individuals as the probability to come in contact with a single active individual (essentially
discounting the probability that a passive individual will encounter multiple active individuals in a
given day). This decision is justified both given how few active individuals there are as compared
to the overall size of the forum and given that in Figure 7a we show that 71% of people interact
with one post before posting themselves. (or becoming active). We consider, over the duration of
an active individual posting on the forum, what fraction of the passive population come in contact
















































Figure 14: Sensitivity of max(A) to c and r Parameters; this plot shows the dependence of our
max(A) on various initialization parameters. This plot highlights that the current estimate lies at
a point with a large gradient where max(A) is not 0 but also not the entire population. This is
consistent with empirical observations where not all investors become interested in a given asset -
even for assets which are most popular on the forum.
Sensitivity of the Maximum of Active Investors to c, r In our model, we are most interest in the
number of active investors, A, at a given point in time. This quantity approximates how many retail
investors that are susceptible to social contagion are actively interested and investing in a given asset
at a point in time. Specifically, we are interested in the max(A) over the course of an entire “social
epidemic” as this would be tied to the maximum market impact that the social contagion would
have. We, therefore consider how max(A) varies with our initial c and r parameters. We initialize
our model with the parameters in our second Tesla discussion, plotted in Figure 13d and observe
how max(A) changes in the surrounding regions for c and r, plotted in Figure 14. We observe that
as r increases (which is the inverse of the duration for which an investor remains interested in a
given asset) the max(A) decreases: as people loose interest quickly, they have less time to spread
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their interest to others and, therefore, the excitement in the given asset dies out with very few active
investors at a given point in time. We also observe that as c increases, which is our contagion rate, the
number of active investors at a point in time increases. A final important point is that a fairly rough
approximation for the c and r parameters from our data place the estimate in a “critical region” of
the graph: a region with a high gradient - a region where not all investors on the forum become active
in the specified asset. This is intuitive as we do not observe that all investors discuss a single asset;
rather a variety of assets are always discussed with different investors becoming part of different
ticker discussions.



































































Figure 15: Sensitivity of Investor Dynamics to A0; this plot shows that the dynamics are relatively
insensitive to how we initialize A0.
Sensitivity of Contagion Dynamics to A0 We also consider how dynamics develop for different
choices of A0, the number of initial investors who become interested and spread interest in an asset,
and plot the evolution for two different values of A0 in Figure 15 while keeping all other parameters
constant. The model appears relatively insensitive to this parameter. A change of A0 from 80 to
10,000 drives only a modest change in the evolution of aggregate investor interest. Interest spreads
faster in the latter, however, max(A) appears relatively consistent demonstrating that other parame-
ters contribute more significantly to max(A) and the overall dynamics. The graph with A0 highlights
a potential flaw with the model; when the right epidemic conditions are met, even a small number of
active individuals can trigger a large surge of interest. However, our parameters are extracted from
a ticker and time when social contagion in TSLA does occur. The spread of interest is not a given for
all initialization parameters and, in fact, is relatively rare.
Sensitivity of Contagion Dynamics toN0 In WSB, we have a changing population (which we alter
in our initialization for the model presented in Figure 13). We observe how dynamics develop for a
different N0, while keeping all other parameters constants, in Figure 16. Our model appears highly
sensitive to this parameter. Even though in the end, the interest spreads to a total number of investors
that is proportional to the increase in N0 (this is observed in the final number of bored individuals),
the interest spreads much quickly for a large N0. This is particularly important as this is tied to a
larger max(A) and a larger potential market impact generated by the discussion.
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Figure 16: Sensitivity of Investor Dynamics to N0; this plot shows that the dynamics are highly
sensitive to how we initialize N0. A larger N0 results in a disproportionate increase in max(A0) and a
fast development of the dynamics.
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A.8 Topic Model












Figure 17: Temporal Trends in Topics; the stacked count, normalized to 100% at each time period,
showing the prevalence of a select subset of topics discussed on WallStreetBets.
Does WSB reflect new information for the larger market to trade on, or social activity that drives
perceived changes in value, regardless of fundamentals? A topic model offers a simple method to
evaluate the content of WSB discussions. Figure 17 presents our preferred topic model, namely the
Biterm Topic Model (BTM), which is optimal for smaller bodies of text (Yan et al. 2013). Submissions
from April 2012 to February 2021 give a time series of almost 100 months. A random sample of
submissions is drawn for the months of January and February 2021 in order to prevent these two
months with a high number of submissions from skewing the topic model results.
Figure 17 presents a stacked plot of the monthly submission count of a selected subset of discus-
sions, normalised by the total across the selected topics. It begins in 2015 when the forum gained a
consistent user base. On one hand, some topics persist in the overall discussion: people consistently
ask for advice about trading accounts and anonymously share details of how their trading is affecting
their personal lives. On the other hand, topics concerned with larger economic trends wax and wane
over the observation period. Two examples of this are the uptick in submissions discussing GME and
Roinhood account trading limits, coinciding with the GME short squeeze, and the COVID-19 topic,
which is negligible until January 2020, but gains prominence in the subsequent months. Pharma-
ceutical company and natural resource discussions, on the other hand, seem to loose popularity. A
full list of topics with their respective keywords is presented below.
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Topic Title Top Words Topic Prevalence (%)
Robinhood Trading Limits
robinhood, gme, account, nkla, margin, order,
app, limit, broker, orders
1.8
International Trade
expected, yr, china, usd, europe, japan, pmi,
manufacturing, korea, data
0.8
Retail Sales + Amazon
sales, amazon, home, stores, business, online,
companies, food, store, retail
3.0
Top Stock Picks / Positions








mentions, vote, log, wsbvotebot, submission,
posts, check, reverse, mention, great
0.2
Electric Cars








drug, fda, phase, patients, vaccine, trial, treat-
ment, results, clinical, covid
2.9
Revenues, Earnings, Ratings
revenue, million, growth, quarter, share, sales,
billion, net, expected, eps
4.0
China Trade Deal








companies, gme, investors, world, years, be-
lieve, hedge, actually, value, funds
7.3
Financial News
data, information, news, financial, report,
based, find, sec, research, investors
4.3
Personal Discussions




million, share, capital, ceo, cannabis, ipo, pub-
lic, management, merger, billion
2.1
Table 8: Topics Extracted from BTM Model
Topic Titles and TopWords, by Mention, in each Topic
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Topic Title Top Words Topic Prevalence (%)
Software Tech Stocks
amd, aapl, intc, companies, data, cloud, soft-
ware, technology, services, tech
3.4
Earnings Release
release, estimates, consensus, share, revenue,
move, open, beat, average, interest
1.0
Natural Resources




fed, rates, rate, economy, markets, economic,
said, interest, growth, inflation
6.0
Other Tech Stocks




virus, covid, cases, coronavirus, china, world,
weeks, corona, states, news
4.8
Other












spy, chart, close, index, month, performance,
major, past, futures, sectors
1.3
Account Help
account, help, investing, best, start, robinhood,
advice, work, years, please
7.4
Other








option, spy, profit, strike, spread, risk, loss,
value, selling, position
6.3
Table 9: Topics Extracted from BTM Model
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